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LABOR LAW-BETWEEN THE OBVIOUS AND THE FOOLISH1: AN 
ApPLICATION OF UCC PRINCIPLES TO THE COMMON LAW OF 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
An employer and a labor union representing several hundred 
employees enter into an agreement purportedly governing the 
working relationship between the company and the employees. As 
a matter of day-to-day practice, however, things are done a little 
differently than the written agreement seems to prescribe. After a 
period of several years, the Company notifies the Union and the 
employees that it desires to return to a strict observance of the 
terms of the contract. The Union protests that current practices 
were in place before the formation of the latest written agreement 
and have become part of the most recent contract. The Union goes 
on to argue that the Company may not unilaterally alter those prac­
tices without negotiating. This situation is further complicated by 
the fact that the most recent writing contains both a no-oral-modifi­
cations (NOM) clause and a merger clause.2 
The federal courts, in mitigating disputes between the parties 
to a collective bargaining agreement,3 are bound to create and 
amend the federal common law of collective bargaining agreements 
1. Clyde W. Summers, Collective Agreements and the Law of Contracts, 78 YALE 
L.J. 525 (1969). In this article, Professor Summers presented what he believed to be an 
unpopular suggestion: that the law of collective bargaining agreements could broaden 
our understanding of contract law. To his detractors, he issued the following warning: 
One who views contract law from the perspective of labor law, and whose 
last working contact with contract law was twenty years ago, should perhaps 
be cautious in venturing broad pronouncements on the subject. The risk is 
great that what may be said here will fall between the two stools of the obvi­
ous and the foolish. But collective agreements are contracts, though long 
treated as disowned offspring; and the law of collective agreements should 
have something to add to our understanding of the law of contracts. 
Id. at 562. 
2. The combination of a NOM clause and a merger clause within a written con­
tract will be referred to throughout this Note as a "zipper clause." See infra notes 55-57 
and accompanying text. 
3. Collective bargaining agreements may be defined as "contracts between an 
employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting com­
merce." Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 § 301,61 Stat. 156,29 U.S.C. § 185 
(1988). 
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in accordance with the policies of national labor law.4 The Labor 
Management Relations Act of 1947 indicates that the utmost prior­
ity of national labor law is to "promote the full flow of commerce."5 
Correspondingly, national labor law seeks to facilitate smooth and 
productive relationships between employers, unions, and the repre­
sented employees.6 
The function of a collective bargaining agreement is to govern 
the working relationship between an employer, a union, and the 
represented employees.7 Proper interpretation of such agreements 
must be rooted in an understanding of the unique nature of collec­
tive bargaining and the policies that national labor law supports.8 
One might argue that the goals of national labor policy may be 
achieved only through a strict reading of the terms that the parties 
themselves have chosen. Suchan interpretation provides parties 
with certainty and confidence that the terms of their contract will 
be upheld. However, courts might recognize the impossibility of 
forecasting every possible contingency that might occur within the 
employer/employee relati<;>nship and allow a reasonable amount of 
flexibility in the face of the unknown. This interpretation leaves the 
collective bargaining agreement as a realistic framework that guides 
the decisions of the parties as they work together. 
Part I of this Note outlines the statutory background of collec­
tive bargaining agreements under the National Labor Relations Act 
as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947. Part 
I goes on to delineate the facts of Martinsville Nylon Employees 
Council v. NLRB,9 trace the procedural history of the case, and 
summarize the majority and dissenting opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Part II begins 
4. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,456 (1957). 
5. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, § l(b), 29 U.S.c. § 141(b) (1988). 
6. Id. The purpose of the Act is as follows: 
It is the purpose and policy of this Act, in order to promote the full flow of 
commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers 
in their relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful proce­
dures for preventing the interference by either with the legitimate rights of the 
other, to protect the rights of individual employees in their relations with labor 
organizations whose activities affect commerce, to define and proscribe prac­
tices on the part of labor and management which affect commerce and are 
inimical to the general welfare, and to protect the rights of the public in con­
nection with labor disputes affecting commerce. 
Id. 
7. Watson v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 399 F.2d 875, 879 (5th Cir. 1968). 
8. Textile Workers Union, 353 U.S. at 456. 
9. 969 F.2d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
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with an analysis of the problems that are created by enforcing a 
zipper clauselo within a collective bargaining agreement. It then 
goes on to stress the similarities between a long-term contract for 
the sale of goods and a collective bargaining agreement and recom­
mends an application of the principles of Article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code ("UCC") to the unique context of collective 
bargaining. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Statutory Background 
A collective bargaining agreement (CBA) is an enforceable 
contract under section 301 of the Management Labor Relations Act 
of 1947 (the "Act").l1 The Act further provides that district courts 
of the United States possess jurisdiction to hear controversies aris­
ing between the parties to a CBA regardless of the citizenship of 
the parties or the amount in controversy.12 The policies giving rise 
to this legislation are outlined in section 1 of the Act, and indicate 
that the Act was an attempt by Congress to minimize disputes be­
tween management and labor that tended to interfere with the flow 
of interstate commerce.l3 To this end, Congress stressed that it was 
in the best interest of management, unions, and labor to observe 
their respective rights and duties as to each other and as to the 
health and safety of the general public.14 Thus, through the Labor 
Management Relations Act of 1947, Congress has sought to protect 
and support the free flow of commerce by encouraging mutual co­
operation among employers, employees, and labor organizations.15 
In interpreting section 301 of the Labor Management Rela­
tions Act of 1947,16 the United States Supreme Court held that the 
federal courts were to create a substantive common law that would 
govern the interpretation and enforcement of collective bargaining 
agreementsP As the Court explained, "[w]e conclude that the sub­
10. See supra note 2, and infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text. 
11. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988). 
12. [d. 
13. § 141. 
14. [d. 
15. The following Senate report indicates a clear legislative intent to this end: 
"Statutory recognition of the collective agreement as a valid, binding, and enforceable 
contract is a logical and necessary step. It will promote a higher degree of responsibility 
upon the parties to such agreements, and will thereby promote industrial peace." S. 
REp. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1947). 
16. § 185. 
17. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
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stantive law to apply in suits under § 301(a) is federal law, which 
the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor 
laws."18 It is against this backdrop that the federal courts of the 
United States must interpret and enforce the terms of collective 
bargaining agreements. 
B. Facts of Martinsville Nylon Employees Council, v. NLRB19 
E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc. ("the Company") oper­
ates a plant in Martinsville, Virginia, which is engaged in the manu­
facture of nylon yams;20 The Martinsville Nylon Employees 
Council Corporation ("the Union") has represented the employees 
at the Martinsville facility for over forty years and has been success­
ful in negotiating a continuous line of collective bargaining agree­
ments with the Company.21 The instant case arose from a collective 
bargaining agreement that was to encompass the period from April 
7, 1986 to August 31, 1987.22 
18. Id. at 456. 
19. 969 F.2d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
20. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 294 N.L.R.B. 563, 565. 
21. Id. 




RECOGNmON AND SCOPE 

Section 1. The UNION is recognized as the exclusive bargaining agency 
for the employees at the Plant as set forth in Article I of this Agreement for 
the purpose of collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours 
of work, and other conditions of employment. 
Section 2. There shall be no discrimination, coercion, interference, or re­
straint by the COMPANY or the UNION or any of their agents against any 
employee because of membership or non-membership in the UNION, and the 
UNION agrees that there shall be no solicitation or promotional UNION ac­
tivity on COMPANY time. 
Section 3. The Agreement constitutes the entire Agreement between the 
parties hereto as of the execution date hereof. However, any supplement 
which may hereafter be mutually agreed upon between the parties when exe­




ADJUSTMENT OF GRIEVANCES 

Section 1. The UNION agrees to select an employee Committee of no 
more than five (5) officials and/or accredited Representatives, including a 
Chairperson, who shall constitute the Grievance Committee. The UNION 
will keep the Plant Management advised of any changes in the personnel of 
this Committee. 
Section 2. In the event that a dispute or grievance shall arise between the 
COMPANY and the UNION or any employee, an earnest effort shall be made 
to settle such dispute or grievance in the following sequence: 
FIRST, the aggrieved employee normally will attempt to obtain a settle­
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During the effective period of this CBA, the Company notified 
the Union that there was a need for heightened efficiency at the 
Martinsville facility.23 On February 2, 1987, the Company 
presented the Union with a memorandum entitled "Union Officials 
and Council Representatives Productivity Proposal" ("the Produc­
ment through the members of supervision directly in charge. However, the 
aggrieved employee may elect to take the matter up directly with his UNION 
Representative who will attempt settlement of the grievance with supervision 
directly in charge. The aggrieved employee may be present. 
SECOND, between the employee's Union Representative and the Area 
supervision of the area in which the grievance occurs. If the UNION Repre­
sentative so desires, he [or she] may have the Grievance Committee Chairman 
present at this step. 
At the FIRST and SECOND Steps, of the grievance procedure an answer 
normally will be given to the UNION by supervision not later than ten (10) 
calendar days after the date the grievance was presented at each step. In the 
event an answer is not given by supervision at a Step, unless an extension of 
time is agreed upon by both parties, the grievance may be presented at the 
next Step. ­
THIRD, failing a satisfactory adjustment as above provided, the UNION 
Grievance Committee may present the grievance to the Plant Manager and/or 
his[/her] designated representatives who will render an answer to the UNION 
within ten (10) calendar days of the date the grievance is presented at this 
Step, unless an extension of time is agreed upon by the parties. 
Any Grievance not presented at the SECOND and THIRD Steps with 
[sic] ten (10) calendar days following supervision's answer to the grievance in 
the preceding Step shall be considered terminated by the parties unless an 
extension of the time is agreed upon by the parties. 
Section 3. In the event that more than one (1) employee is involved in a 
grievance or dispute in the FIRST Step, the number of employees, exclusive of 
the UNION Representative, to confer with supervision shall be agreed upon 
between supervision and the UNION. 
Section 4. Meetings between elected officials and/or accredited Repre­
sentatives of the UNION and the Plant Management will be permitted on 
COMPANY time and COMPANY property in cases where such meetings are 
for the purpose of conferring with the Plant Management. No elected officials 
or Representatives shall be paid for the time consumed in a meeting with the 
Plant Management outside of his{lherJ regular working hours. No change in 
the working hours of an elected official or Representative will be made for the 
purpose of conducting business of the UNION except in cases where a Repre­
sentative or elected official may make his{lherJ own arrangements with another 
qualified employee, subject to the approval of his{lherJ supervision and pro­
vided no overtime pay is incurred. 
Section 5. An accredited Representative of the UNION, on being 
presented with a grievance shall be allowed a reasonable amount of time dur­
ing working hours without loss of pay to receive, investigate and handle such 
grievance in accordance with the grievance procedure after obtaining permis­
sion from his{iherJ immediate supervision. It is understood that in contacting 
an employee concerning the settlement of handling of a grievance, prior advice 
of the desire to make the contact will be given to the employee's supervision. 
Id. at 567 n.6 (emphasis added). 
23. Id. at 565. 
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tivity Proposal" or "the Proposal").24 The Company noted in this 
memorandum that for the past several years union representatives 
had enjoyed great freedom to pursue union business on company 
time and with pay.25 
Day-to-day. practices had developed at the Martinsville facility 
that permitted union officials and representatives to spend 60% to 
100% of their on-the-job time engaged in various union activities.26 
Common practice had come to allow Union officials and represent­
atives to leave their production posts, at their own discretion, to 
pursue active employeegrievancesP Union officials and repre­
sentatives were also free to spend time in the Union office, located 
on the company premises, researching employee grievances; to con­
fer with other Union representatives and the represented employ­
ees regarding existing or potential infractions of the CBA; and to 
walk freely about the plant facility to "police" the terms of the 
CBA.28 These Union activities all took place during the representa­
tives' scheduled shifts, and the representatives were fully compen­
sated by the Company for time spent on Union business.29 
Prior to the issuance of the Proposal, the Company made no 
complaint concerning the amount of time the Union representatives 
were spending away from their formal production duties.30 In fact, 
there were several instances where the Company accommodated 
shift changes for Union representatives to facilitate the pursuit of 
Union business.31 
At the time that the Company presented the Union with the 
Proposal, it informed the Union that it was opening negotiations on 
the substantive contents of the Proposa1.32 In essence, the Produc­
24. Id. 
25. Id. The Union alleged that its officials and representatives had been pennit­
ted to exclusively pursue Union business on company time since January 1965. Id. at 
566. The Administrative Law Judge found that the Company relaxed the fonnal super­
vision of Union officials and representatives in, or shortly before, 1980. Id. at 567. 
26. Id. at 565. Union officials and representatives were employees of E. I. du 
Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc. an(j received their wages from the company. The Union 
did not provide these individuals with additional compensation. 
27. Id. 
28. Martinsville Nylon Employees Council v. NLRB, 969 F.2d 1263, 1265 (D.c. 
Cir.1992). 
29. Id. 
30. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 294 N.L.R.B. 563, 565 (1989). 
31. Id. 
32. Id. Not only was the substance of the Productivity Proposal a great source of 
conflict, but the parties also had great difficulty in simply discussing the proposal. The 
Company made almost daily offers to meet with the Union representatives but stipu­
lated that no shift changes or accommodations would be made to facilitate the attend­
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tivity Proposal stated that the Company would require Union offi­
cials and representatives, with the exception of the Union 
president, to work their scheduled shifts and to seek the permission 
of their immediate supervisors before leaving their posts in the pur­
suit of an employee grievance.33 The Proposal made it clear that 
the Company would once again require production work from the 
Union officials and representatives.34 The Company estimated that 
requiring Union officials and. representatives to perform production 
work would lead to a savings of $400,000 per year.35 
The Union objected to the implementation of the Proposal in 
its entirety and maintained that such· a proposal could not be dis­
cussed until contract negotiation time.36 The Company repeatedly 
offered opportunities for negotiation, but to no avail. On March 8, 
1987, the Company enacted the Proposal and issued a memoran­
dum to its supervisors which detailed its implementation.37 
From that date forward, Union officials and representatives 
would be required to follow ·the strict language of the collective bar­
gaining agreement.38 In order to obtain permission to pursue a 
grievance, the Union representative and her or his immediate su­
pervisor were to engage in a prescribed colloquy consisting of five 
questions.39 The memo also established that the supervisor had dis­
cretion to permit the pursuit of a grievance as the employee's work 
load allowed.40 Finally, the supervisor of that Union representative 
was to contact the supervisor of the grievant to set up a mutually 
ance of any Union representative. This position meant that any Union representative 
who was not on the day shift would not be paid to attend a meeting between 8:00 a.m. 
and 4:00 p.m. Those Union representatives who attended the meetings and who were 
day shift employees would draw their normal wages. The Union then established the 
position that any further meetings between Company and Union officials must take 
place after 4:30 p.m. and on neutral territory. [d. at 566. 
33. [d. at 565-66. 
34. [d. 
35. [d. at 566. 
36. [d. 
37. [d. 
38. See supra note 22 at Art. XII, § 5. 
39. E. L du Pont de Nemours & Co., 294 N .L.R.B. at 566. The five questions were 
as follows: 
1. Who is the grievant or employee with whom you want to meet? 
2. What area of the plant does he/she work? 
3. Who is the employee's supervisor or contact supervisor? 
4. What is the nature of the grievance? 
5. How much time do you think you will need? 
[d. 
40. [d. 
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convenient meeting between the representative and the 
employee.41 




The complaints filed by the Union alleged that the Company 
had violated sections 8(a)(1), (3), (5), and 8(d) of the National La­
bor Relations Act ("NLRA").43 Essentially, the Union claimed 
that the Company had unilaterally altered the working conditions 
at the Martinsville facility without providing an opportunity to bar­
gain or negotiate and that such behavior constituted an unfair labor 
practice for the purposes of the NLRA.44 
The Administrative Law Judge ("AU") held that the Com­
pany did not attempt to modify the CBA, but simply returned to a 
strict interpretation of its terms:45 
[T]he deviation from contractual provisions or the relaxation of 
rules contained therein did not amount to a waiver of Respon­
dent's rights under the contract or to the establishment of a past 
practice; and that when, on 8 March, the Respondent, for purely 
economic reasons, returned to a literal interpretation of the con
tract and strict enforcement of its rights thereunder, it did not 
thereby refuse to bargain in good faith, in violation of the Act.46 
On May 17, 1988, the AU dismissed the Union's complaint in its 
entirety.47 
Following the decision of the AU, the Union filed exceptions 
and supporting briefs with the National Labor Relations Board 
("NLRB" or "the Board"). The Board agreed with the AU that 
the Company had not violated sections of the NLRA "when it of­
fered to bargain over changes in the practices and when its own 
bargaining position was essentially to return to the written terms of 
the agreement. "48 
The Board, however, drew a distinction between returning to 
the express terms of the CBA on the one hand and implementing a 
restriction that was (1) not contained in the CBA and (2) which was 
41. 	 Id.. 
42. 	 969·F.2d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
43. 	 Id. at 1265. 
44. 	 E.!. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 294 N.L.R.B. at 565. 
45. 	 Id. at 567. 
46. 	 Id. (emphasis added). 
47. 	 Id. at 571. 
48. 	 Id. at 563. 
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contrary to past practice on the other. The NLRB held that the 
CBA contained no language that gave rise to question four49 of the 
Company's prescribed colloquy, which asked, "What is the nature 
of the grievance?"50 The Board reasoned that requiring a Union 
representative to answer this question before allowing that repre­
sentative to pursue an employee grievance was a unilateral mid­
term modification of the CBA and as such, amounted to a violation 
of section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act.51 The NLRB 
required the Company to remove question four from its Productiv­
ity Proposal and then dismissed the remainder of the Union's com­
plaint.52 The Union alone sought appeal in the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia.53 
D. 	 The Majority Opinion in Martinsville Nylon Employees 
Council v. NLRB54 
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum­
bia framed its analysis of the issues in three parts. In Part A, the 
court discussed the ramifications of the no-oral-modification 
(NOM) clause contained within the collective bargaining agree­
ment.55 In Part B, the court reasoned that the NOM clause could 
be combined with the merger clause56 of the CBA to form a "zip­
per" clause.57 The court then held that the zipper clause proscribed 
49. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
50. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 294 N.L.R.B. at 563-64 & n.3. The Board 
noted that questions 1, 2, 3, and 5 of the five questions promulgated by the Company 
could all be "fairly implied from the contract terms." [d. at 564. However, the Board 
went on to hold that "[t]he contract terms do not ... clearly imply that the Respondent 
was free to learn in advance 'the nature of the grievance.'" [d. (quoting question 4 of 
the CBA). 
51. [d. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 158 (d) (1988». 
52. Martinsville Nylon Employees Council v. NLRB, 969 F.2d 1263, 1266 (D.C. 
Cir. 1992). 
53. [d. 
54. 969 F.2d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
55. [d. at 1267. The NOM clause provided that" 'any supplement which may 
hereafter be mutually agreed upon between the parties when executed in the same man­
ner as this Agreement shall become and be part of this Agreement.'" Id. at 1265 (quot­
ing E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 294 N.L.R.B. 563, 567 n.6 (1989» (emphasis 
added). See also supra note 22 for the pertinent text of the collective bargaining . 
agreement. 
56. Martinsville, 969 F.2d at 1268. The merger clause provided that" '[t]his 
[CBA] constitutes the entire Agreement between the parties hereto as of the execution 
date hereof.'" [d. at 1265 (quoting E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 294 N.L.R.B. at 
567 n.6) (emphasis added). See also supra note 22 for the pertinent text of the collec­
tive bargaining agreement. 
57. [d. at 1265 ("[T]he AU relied upon ... Article II § 3, the so-called 'zipper' 
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the inclusion of any past practice within the terms of the collective 
bargaining agreement.58 Finally, in Part C, the Martinsville court 
reasoned that "past practice may still inform the Board's under­
standing of what the written agreement means."59 
1. 	 Part A - Treatment of NOM Clauses Under the Uniform 
Commercial Code 
The majority, in an opinion written by Judge Ginsburg, began 
its analysis with the Union's argument that, under existing common 
law, a no-oral-modification clause is essentially unenforceable.60 
While agreeing with this contention, the court then explained that 
this traditional common law rule has been discarded in many areas 
of the law.61 Specifically, the court pointed to Article 2 of the UCC, 
which has been adopted in every state to govern the creation and 
enforcement of contracts for the sale of goods.62 Section 2-209(2) 
of the UCC provides that "[a] signed agreement which excludes 
modification or rescission except by a signed writing cannot be 
otherwise modified or rescinded."63 Thus, a NOM clause is en­
forceable under Article 2 of the UCc.64 
After outlining these two strong positions in contract law, the 
majority explicitly stated its preference for the UCC treatment of 
NOM clauses.65 Judge Ginsburg likened the parties to a CBA to 
"'merchants' within the meaning of UCC 2-104" in that they pos­
sess knowledge of the terms under negotiation and are represented 
by counsel when the negotiations take place.66 The court further 
reasoned that a strong profit motive on both sides of the table en­
sured that no one would miss "the fine print" or include a "mean­
ingless provision against oral modifications. "67 
Judge Ginsburg found that the UCC view enabled sophisti­
cated parties to consciously include or exclude an enforceable no­
oral-modification provision and, in essence, control their own 
clause, consisting of both an 'entire agreement' provision and" a 'no-oral-modification' 
provision. "). 
58. 	 Id. at 1268. 
59. 	 Id. at 1269. 
60. 	 [d. at 1267. 
61. 	 [d. 
62. 	 Id. 
63. 	 [d. (quoting V.C.c. § 2-209(2) (1990». 
64. 	 V.C.c. § 2-209(2) (1990). 
65. 	 Martinsville, 969 F.2d at 1267. 
66. 	 [d. (citing V.C.C. § 2-104 (1990». 
67. 	 Id. 
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destiny.68 The common law view, on the other hand, simply renders 
such a provision unenforceable. The court reasoned that the tradi­
tional common law view robbed parties of the ability to restrict the 
manner in which future modifications to the CBA were to be 
made.69 
The majority then addressed the question of whether national 
labor policy prohibited the enforcement of NOM clauses.7o The 
court noted that in Certified Corp. v. Hawaii Teamsters & Allied 
Workers, Local 996,71 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
adopted the common law stance against NOM clauses, explaining 
that such a prohibition would encourage parties to a CBA to re­
solve a dispute through further negotiations rather than coercion or 
strike.72 The Martinsville court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's 
conclusion that "overriding a no-oral-modification clause in a CBA 
'effectuates the federal policy of maintaining 'industrial peace."'73 
Judge Ginsburg concluded that the position taken in Certified 
Corp. would actually lead to "industrial strife."74 The court rea­
soned that the clear intent of the parties when they included a 
NOM clause could not be ignored.75 To do so would cause uncer­
tainty as to which terms of the CBA would be enforced, as well as 
bickering among the parties over "who said what to whom."76 
The majority embraced the concepts of self-determination and 
certainty in contract formation as embodied in .the VCC view of 
NOM clauses.77 As Judge Ginsburg stated, "we are confident that 
the VCC rule will better serve the purposes of collective bargaining 
and of industrial peace. "78 It should be noted, however, that the 
court refused to base its holding upon this reasoning. Indeed, the 
court began part B of its opinion by explicitly stating that it had not 
made a final determination between the traditional common law 
view and the VCC view of the NOM clause.79 
68. [d. 
69. [d. 
70. [d. at 1267-68. 
71. 597 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1979). 
72. Martinsville, 969 F.2d at 1268. 
73. [d. at 1268 (quoting Certified Corp., 597 F.2d at 1271). 
74. [d. 
75. [d. at 1267. 
76. [d. at 1268. 
77. [d. 
78. [d. at 1268. 
79. [d. 
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2. 	 Part B - Combination of a NOM Clause and a Merger 
Clause Forms an Impenetrable Zipper Clause 
The zipper clause contained in Article II of the collective bar­
gaining agreement proved determinative.80 Judge Ginsburg con­
cluded that the additional inclusion of the "entire agreement" or 
merger clause in the CBA left no doubt as to the intentions of the 
parties.81 The court held that the combination of the NOM clause 
and the merger clause formed an impenetrable zipper clause that 
did not permit the incorporation of any past practice into the terms 
of the collective bargaining agreement.82 The court made clear that 
no past practice, either consistent or inconsistent with the explicit 
terms of the CBA, was to be incorporated.83 
In reaching this conclusion, the majority took issue with the 
distinction made by the NLRB between past practices that were 
consistent with the terms of the CBA and those that were not. The 
Board held that the entire agreement clause served to bar the incor­
poration of any past practice that was inconsistent with the express 
terms of the CBA.84 Judge Ginsburg took the NLRB's explanation 
to imply that the merger clause did not serve to bar the incorpora­
tion of any past practices that were "not inconsistent"85 with the 
express terms of the CBA.86 The majority emphatically rejected 
this implicit proposition, holding it to be "flatly inconsistent with 
the entire agreement clause."87 The court reasoned that the entire 
agreement clause states that the totality of the agreement between 
80. See supra note 22 for the pertinent text of the collective bargaining 
agreement. 
81. 	 Martinsville, 969 F.2d at 1268. Judge Ginsburg emphasized that the written 
CBA was closed to any alteration that did not come in written form: 
[B]y including the entire agreement clause the parties here made clear beyond 
doubt their intention not to be bound to any informal arrangement to which 
they might voluntarily adhere during the term of their CBA. In effect, each 
told the other: "If you want anything else, you'll have to get it in writing," and 
to this they both agreed. 
Id. 
82. 	 Id. 
83. 	 Id. 
84. 	 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 294 N.L.R.B. 563,563 (1989). 
85. Martinsville, 969 F.2d at 1268. The court explained its use of a double nega­
tive by stating that "[the NLRB's] clear implication is that a practice not inconsistent 
with the CBA (Le., it adds to rather than alters it) is incorporated into the CBA." Id. 
It appears that holding a practice to be consistent with the written terms of a con­
tract and holding a practice to be not inconsistent with the written terms of a contract 
carry different meanings for the purpose of the court's analysis. 
86. 	 Id. 
87. 	 Id. 
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the parties is embodied in the written terms of the CBA.88 The 
majority found that the entire agreement clause in conjunction with 
the NOM clause revealed the clear intent of the parties.89 No addi­
tion or alteration of this CBA was to be made in the absence of a 
further writing. 
3. 	 Part C - Course of Performance Plays a Limited Role in 
the Face of a Zipper Clause 
Finally, the majority explained that, while the past practices of 
the parties were not to be incorporated within the express terms of 
the CBA, the past practices of the parties could be used to inform 
the court as to what the terms of the CBA actually meant.90 In 
interpreting the language of the CBA, the court reasoned that "the 
parties' course of performance may be the best evidence of their 
intent in using a particular term."91 The court found support for 
this premise in both case law92 and section 2-208 of the UCC.93 
The majority opinion explained that the decisions of the Ad­
ministrative Law Judge and the National Labor Relations Board 
were based upon the belief that the entire substance of the agree­
ment between the Company and the Union could be gleaned from 
the terms of the CBA alone.94 In the words of the court, "[b]oth 
[the AU and the Board] seem to have assumed that the meaning of 
the contract is to be discerned entirely from within its four cor­
ners."95 Judge Ginsburg opined that this was "particularly unfortu­
nate ... where the past practice predated the current contract."96 
In essence, the court proposed that the current contract may have 
been an attempt by the parties to memorialize what had come to be 
the day-to-day practices at the plant.97 As the court illustrated: 
88. 	 [d. at 1268-69. 
89. 	 [d. at 1268. 
90. 	 [d. at 1269. 
91. 	 [d. 
92. [d. (citing Carey Canada, Inc. v. Columbia Casualty Co., 940 F.2d 1548 (D.C. 
Cir. 1991)). 
93. [d. (citing V.C.C. § 2-208). Section 2-208(1) provides that "any course of 
perfonnance accepted or acquiesced in without objection shall be relevant to detennine 
the meaning of the agreement." V.C.C. § 2-208(1) (1990). 
Section 2-208(2) provides further that "[t]he express tenns of the agreement and 
any such course of perfonnance ... shall be construed whenever reasonable as consis­
tent with each other." V.C.C. § 2-208(2) (1990). 
94. 	 Martinsville, 969 F.2d at 1269. 
95. 	 [d. 
96. 	 [d. 
97. 	 [d. at 1270. 
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For example, Article XII, § 5, provides that a union representa­
tive may process a grievance during working hours "after ob­
taining permission from his immediate supervision." Since the 
Employer had not since 1980 required a union representative to 
get permission each time before handling a grievance, could not 
§ 5 refer to the apparently blanket permission that union repre­
sentatives had been given in practice?98 
The majority found error in the prior proceedings because no 
attempt was made to compare the terms of the CBA with the ongo­
ing practices of the parties to determine if such a memorialization 
was intended.99 The court remanded the case to the National La­
bor Relations Board "to consider the relevance of past practice to 
the meaning of the contract as written."loo 
E. 	 The Dissent in Martinsville Nylon Employees Council v. 
NLRBlOl 
In her dissenting opinion, Judge Wald registered two major 
complaints with the opinion of the majority. The greater portion of 
Judge Wald's dissent chastised the majority for its "dicta" in Part A 
of its opinion.lo2 The dissent reasoned that strict enforcement of 
NOM clauses within collective bargaining agreements was both ill­
conceived and unsupported.103 Judge Wald argued that, while it is 
the place of the federal judiciary to create the federal common law 
of collective bargaining agreements, such development must take 
place in accordance with the policies of national labor law.104 The 
dissent opined that a federal court may not rely upon the principles 
of commercial law as embodied in the VCC while fashioning a set 
of rules to govern the interpretation and enforcement of collective 
bargaining agreements.lOS 
The dissent then questioned the majority's treatment of the 
holding in Certified Corp. v. Hawaii Teamsters & Allied Workers, 
Loca1996.106 Judge Wald explained that the flexibility sought to be 
98. 	 Id. 
99. 	 Id. at 1269-70. 
100. 	 Id. at 1270. 
101. 	 Id. at 1270 (Weld, J., dissenting. 
102. 	 Id. 
103. 	 Id. at 1270-72. 
104. Id. at 1270 (citing Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456­
57 (1957». 
105. 	 Id. 
106. 597 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1979). 

Judge Wald stated, "I believe Certified Corp. may ~ave more to offer than my 
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achieved in Certified Corp. appears to promote a smooth and coop­
erative relationship between management and labor.107 The judge 
reasoned that such a relationship was obviously "an incontrovert­
ible goal of federal labor policies. "108 
The dissent stressed the unique nature of the collective bar­
gaining relationship and the fundamental role of federal labor pol­
icy in forming the federal common· law of collective bargaining 
agreements. It explained that the "'unforeseeable contingen­
cies"'109 that occur every day within the management/labor rela­
tionship must be met with flexibility in order to achieve the goals of 
national labor policy.110 Rigid structure and certainty would prove 
to be costly and disruptive in the arena of labor negotiations.111 
Judge Wald's second major disagreement with the majority 
concerned the distinction which the majority drew between the use 
of course of performance to create new contract terms and its use as 
a tool in contract interpretation.112 Judge Wald reasoned that "the 
line between interpreting contract language in light of past practices 
and saying that established practices, when consistent with contract 
language, will be deemed covered by the contract is a theoretical 
one at best. I can only wonder how distinctly it can be applied in 
practice. "113 
II. ANALYSIS 
The majority in Martinsville held that the combination of the 
merger clause and the NOM clause within the CBA proved disposi­
tive.114 First, the court reasoned that the merger clause barred the 
incorporation of any implicit arrangement within the agreement: on 
the date of execution the written CBA stood as the totality of the 
agreement between the parties.115 Second, the NOM clause pro-
colleagues grant." Maninsville, 969 F.2d at 1271 (Wald, J., dissenting). See supra notes 
70-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of the majority's treatment of Cenified 
Corp. 
107. Maninsville, 969 F.2d at 1271. 
108. [d. (citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967». 




112. [d. at 1272. 
113. [d. 
114. [d. at 1268. 
115. [d. 
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vided that any alteration must come in the form of a writing.116 In 
the face of a zipper clause, any practice that was not embodied in 
the CBA or in a subsequent written modification had no legal 
effect.117 
The Union argued that the parties' course of performance over 
the past several years affected a modification of their agreement 
and had come to allow enhanced freedoms for Union representa­
tives.118 The Martinsville court rejected the Union's argument and 
held that the CBA was limited to its explicit written terms. On 
April 7, 1986, the CBA in question became the entire agreement 
between the parties. Any practice that was not contained in that 
writing was not a part of the agreement.119 After April 7, no prac­
tice could be said to modify the CBA unless memorialized by a 
writing. As the majority explained: 
[T]he parties here made clear beyond doubt their intention not to 
be bound to any infomlal arrangement to which they might vol­
untarily adhere during the term of their CBA. In effect, each 
told the other: "If you want anything else, you'll have to get it in 
writing," and to this both agreed.120 
In essence, the court reasoned that industrial turmoil would result if 
parties were unsure which portions of their CBA would be 
enforced.121 
The Martinsville court explained that 'although past practices 
could not be incorporated into the CBA, such practices might in­
form the court as to the parties' intended meaning of the written 
terms.122 The Martinsville court then remanded the case to the 
NLRB to determine if the contested practice was simply an imple­
mentation of the written terms of the CBA. Notwithstanding the 
court's instructions on remand, it appears that the behavior of 
Union representatives may have actually contradicted the explicit 
116. Id. at 1269. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 1265. 
119. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 294 N.L.R.B. 563, 563 (1989). 
120. Martinsville, 969 F.2d at 1268. 
121. Id. The court was strenuous in its advocacy on this point: 
We think it more likely that judicial disregard for the parties' expressed intent 
that any modification be in writing is more likely to promote industrial strife 
by encouraging prevarication about who said what to whom, and to create 
uncertainty about what a court will determine are the actual obligations of the 
parties. 
Id. 
122. Id. at 1269. 
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terms of the CBA. Union representatives moved about the plant 
and engaged in Union business at their own discretion. This prac­
tice was not explicitly authorized by either the primary CBA or any 
subsequent memorandum of modification. In fact, one could argue 
that such behavior actually contradicted the CBA requirement of 
supervisory permission.123 
The Martinsville court reached the correct result in affirming 
the NLRB's dismissal of the Union's complaint. However, the rea­
soning supporting this conclusion seems strained, primarily because 
of the court's reliance on the zipper clause. Enforcement of a zip­
per clause within a CBA presents at least two major problems. 
First, it appears that such a clause could prove overly-restrictive in 
the context of industrial labor relations. It is difficult' to imagine a 
collective bargaining agreement that could even begin to set out the 
procedures, rights, and duties involved in every possible con tin­
gency.124 Second, the court's reliance 'on the zipper clause includes 
an implicit reliance upon the widely criticized NOM clause. 
As stressed in the Martinsville dissent, the need for flexibility 
within the collective bargaining relationship cannot be overstated. 
Judge Wald argued that "[t]here are too many unforeseeable con­
tingencies in a collective bargaining relationship to justify making 
the words of the contract the exclusive source of rights. and 
duties."125 
123. 	 The seemingly applicable section of the written CBA states as follows: 
Section 5. An accredited Representative of the UNION, on being 
presented with a grievance shall be allowed a reasonable amount of time dur­
ing working hours without loss of pay to receive, investigate and handle such 
grievance in accordance with the grievance procedure after obtaining permis­
sion from his immediate supervision. It is understood that in contacting an 
employee concerning the settlement of handling of a grievance, prior advice of 
the desire to make the contact will be given to the employee's supervision. 
E.!. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 294 N.L.R.B. at 567 n.6 (emphasis added). 
124. See infra note 133 and accompanying text. 
125. Martinsville, 969 F.2d at 1271 (Wald, J., dissenting) (quoting Humphrey v. 
Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 353-54 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring». See also HARRY SHUL­
MAN & NEIL w. CHAMBERLAIN, CASES ON LABOR RELATIONS 3 (1949). 
[C]ollective bargaining involves first, the negotiation of a general agreement 
as to terms and conditions of employment, and second, the maintenance of the 
parties' relations for the period of the agreement. The first process is the dra­
matic one which catches the public eye and which is sometimes mistaken to be 
the entire function of collective bargaining. But in fact, it is to labor relations 
approximately what the wedding is to domestic relations. It launches the par­
ties on their joint enterprise with good wishes and good intentions. The life of 
the enterprise then depends on continuous, daily cooperation and adjustment. 
[d. 
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Due to the inherent dynamics of the collective bargaining rela­
tionship, the potential for necessary alterations and modifications is 
infinite.126 Within this context, the operation of an industrial pro­
duction facility under an enforceable zipper clause would prove 
both time consuming and expensive. 
Further, in relying upon the zipper clause, the court based at 
least a portion of its holding upon the enforceability of NOM 
clauses, notwithstanding the fact that courts have universally held 
that such clauses are not enforceable at common law.127 As Judge 
Cardozo stated in 1919, "[t]hose who make a contract may unmake 
it. The clause which forbids a change may be chang~d like any 
other."128 
In the face of opposition to the enforceability of NOM clauses, 
the Martinsville majority drew an analogy to contracts for the sale 
of goods.129 Article 2 of the VCC provides that NOM clauses in 
contracts for the sale of goods are enforceable under certain cir­
cumstances.130 The court reasoned that the unique context of col­
lective bargaining would be well-served by a similar rule.131 
The common law and the VCC are in direct opposition132 and 
such contlict of authorities indicates that the enforceability of a 
NOM clause must be questioned. Close scrutiny, however, reveals 
126. 	 Martinsville, 969 F.2d at 1271 (Wald, J., dissenting). 
Unanticipated amendments may, for example, be necessary in the context 
of a bid with a time deadline, or in other constraining situations where flexible 
procedures will make the difference between failure and success for both labor 
and management. Requiring that all such impromptu modifications be memo­
rialized in writing (with attendant costs in time, effort, and money), may be 
counterproductive to the best interests of both sides. 
Id. 
127. Commercial Contractors, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Quar. Co., 524 
F.2d 944, 952 (5th Cir. 1975); Teer v. George A. Fuller Co., 30 F.2d 30, 31 (4th Cir. 
1929); Eastline Corp. v. Marion Apartments Ltd., 524 So. 2d 582, 584 (Miss. 1988); 
ABC Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Dolhun's Marine, Inc., 157 N.W.2d 680, 683 (Wis. 
1968). 
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 283 cmt. band 148 cmt. b. 
(1979). 
128. Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 122 N.E. 378, 381 (N.Y. 1919). 
129. Martinsville, 969 F.2d at 1267-68. 
130. U.C.C. § 2-209(2) (1990). 
131. Martinsville, 969 F.2d at 1268. 
132. Alysse Kaplan, Note, Partial Satisfaction Under the uee, 61 FORDHAM L. 
REv. 221, 237-38 (1992). "Under common-law principles for modification of an agree­
ment, both parties must offer consideration. Under the uce, however, this has 
changed to reflect the Code's emphasis on flexibility and the facilitation of commercial 
transactions. UCC § 2-209(1) specifies that no consideration is necessary to modify a 
contract." Id. (footnote omitted). 
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that the similarities between contracts for the sale of goods and col­
lective bargaining agreements warrant the application of VCC prin­
ciples to the federal common law of collective bargaining. 
Regrettably, the Martinsville majority failed to fully evaluate the 
application of commercial law within the unique context of collec­
tive bargaining. 
A. 	 Zipper Clauses in Collective Bargaining Agreements Should 

Not Be Strictly Enforced 

Courts and commentators alike have suggested that no writing 
could ever embody the "entire agreement" between a company, a 
union, and the individual employees.133 At best, the boilerplate 
language of a merger clause within a CBA provides the parties with 
an unrealistic and misleading sense of completion. At worst, a 
merger clause provides courts with the temptation to indulge in a 
legal fiction. l34 The addition of a NOM clause further binds the 
hands of the parties to a CBA and unduly burdens the daily opera­
tion of an industrial production facility. 
The Martinsville court based its holding upon the zipper clause 
found in the parties' CBA.135 The court held that the written terms 
133. Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 
154-55 (1969) ("It would be virtually impossible to include all working conditions in a 
collective-bargaining agreement."); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 353-54 (1964) 
(Goldberg, J., concurring) ("There are too many unforeseeable contingencies in a col­
lective bargaining relationship to justify making the words of the contract the exclusive 
source of rights and duties."); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 
363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960) (A CBA "is more than a contract; it is a generalized code to 
govern a myriad of cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate."); Railway 
Labor Executives Ass'n v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 833 F.2d 700, 705 (7th Cir. 1987) 
("A written agreement, however, does not necessarily contain all relevant working con­
ditions.... The parties' collective agreement, therefore, includes both the specific terms 
set forth in the written agreement and any well established practices that constitute a 
'course of dealing' between the [employer] and employees.") (citations omitted). 
ARCHIBALD Cox, LAW AND TIiE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 79 (Greenwood Press 
1983) (1960) ("A collective agreement rarely expresses all the rights and duties falling 
within its scope. One cannot spell out every detail of life in an industrial establishment, 
or even that portion which both management and labor regard as matters of mutual 
concern."); see also Summers, supra note 1, at 529 ("Because of the diverse congeries of 
matters covered by a collective agreement and the practical need for a readable and 
reasonably concise document, a written agreement cannot possibly provide for the myr­
iad of variant situations which might arise, even if they could be foreseen."). 
134. Merk v. Jewel Food Stores, 945 F.2d 889, 902 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook, 
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 914 (1992). "Manville said that 'national labor 
policy' forbids labor and management to have a fully integrated contract no matter how 
strongly they prefer the benefits of certainty." Id. (citing Manville Forest Prod., Inc. v. 
Paperworkers Union, 831 F.2d 72, 75-76 (5th Cir. 1987». 
135. 	 Martinsville, 969 F.2d at 1268. 
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of the CBA embodied the totality of the agreement between the 
Company, the Union, and the employees. However, this conclusion 
appears unrealistic in that the day-to-day operations of a produc­
tion facility present new and unique situations almost constantly.D6 
Following the majority's reasoning, an enforceable zipper 
clause will lead to costly and time consuming results, for each new 
situation will be met with calls to the parties' respective attorneys. 
Negotiations and deliberations will be followed by memorialization 
of the new terms of the agreement, and then everyone may go back 
to work. 
The costs and delays involved in following such a procedure do 
not comport with the efficient operation of a business. Economic 
reality dictates that business-people allow themselves the freedom 
to act quickly in a dynamic market.137 It seems counterintuitive 
that players in the industrial production realm would bind them­
selves to a written agreement, oruy to engage in the delusion that 
they had provided for all future events. 
Because of the dynamic character of the collective bargaining 
relationship, the parties to a CBA should be dissuaded from bur­
dening themselves with a zipper clause. Although parties do retain 
the ability to alter their agreement, such alterations must come in 
written form.138 Under the circumstances, even this restriction ap­
pears to present an unbearable hindrance. The better-reasoned ap­
proach would be to put all parties involved in collective bargaining 
on notice that there is no such thing as a fully integrated CBA.139 
In essence, the parties to a CBA should be counseled to expect the 
136. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit explained the vital importance of 
flexibility under a CBA as follows: 
A collective bargaining contract operates prospectively over a substantial pe­
riod of time and the parties cannot be expected to foresee all the problems 
that will develop in an industrial establishment within the period of the con­
tract and more scope must be left for decisions made in the course of perform­
ing the agreement. The parties to the collective bargaining agreement share a 
degree of mutual interdependence for the cost of disagreement is great and 
the pressure to reach agreement is so intense that the parties are willing to 
contract with the thought in mind of working out the problems of interpreting 
and amending when the inevitable problems arise. 
Watson v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 399 F.2d 875,879 (5th Cir. 1968) (emphasis 
added) (footnote omitted). 
137. See supra note 126. 
138. Martinsville, 969 F.2d at 1269. 
139. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. See also Anthony Carabba, 
Comment, Merk v. Jewel Food Stores: The Parol Evidence Rule Applied to Collective 
Bargaining Agreements - A Trend Toward More Formality in the Name of National La­
bor Policy?, 10 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 719 (1993). 
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unexpected and to build a degree of flexibility into their written 
agreements. 
In the absence of an ironclad zipper clause, alternative mecha­
nisms must be established to protect the parties' freedom to con­
tract, while at the same time allowing for the flexibility required by 
economic reality. The federal common law of collective bargaining 
agreements should be developed to give fuller effect to parties' 
course of performance. Concurrently, barriers to fraud, extortion, 
and false allegations must be constructed to ensure that no course 
of performance is enforced as a modification unless it was genuinely 
intended as such. 
The interworkings of Article 2 of the UCC provide just such a 
compromise. Section 2-209 of the UCC fosters flexibility in the 
modification of contracts for the sale of goods. At the same time, 
however, section 2-209 erects barriers to overreaching and misrep­
resentation.140 The compromise embodied in section 2-209 is an at­
tempt to embrace commercial reality and formulate a set of 
workable rules within that context. An application of this very 
compromise could prove quite successful within the context of col­
lective bargaining. 
B. 	 A Comparison of Contracts for the Sale of Goods and 
Collective Bargaining Agreements 
1. 	 A Useful Analogy May Be Drawn 
At first glance, the differences between contracts for the sale of 
goods and CBAs seem glaringly apparent. A typical contract for 
the sale of goods involves a defined quantity, a specified price, and 
a designated date of completion.141 In contrast, the terms of a col­
140. 2 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE SERIES § 2-209:01 
at 202-03 (1992). 
Section 2-209 has three main objectives. First, in accordance with the 
Code's policy of preserving flexibility of commercial contracts, it validates 
modifications of sales contracts that are made in good faith, even though those 
modifications are not supported by consideration. Second, it invalidates modi­
fications that are made in bad faith, even though such modifications are sup­
ported by consideration. Finally, the section offers protection against the 
possibility that one party to the contract will fraudulently or mistakenly assert 
that an oral modification has been made, when, in fact, it has not. 
Id. at 203 (footnotes omitted). 
141. Merk v. Jewel Food Stores, 945 F.2d 889, 901 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook, 
J., dissenting), cen. denied, 504 U.S. 914 (1992). 
It is perverse to say that the contracting process in labor must be more 
formal than the contracting process in shipping or construction or natural re­
sources. You can define how much coal to sell and where to deliver it .... 
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lective bargaining agreement provide for the future conduct and in­
teraction of many people, and "[m]any provisions do little but 
establish the framework for further bargaining."142 Under these 
definitions, it appears that no productive analogy may be drawn be­
tween contracts for the sale of goods and collective bargaining 
agreements. 
The difficulty here, however, lies in our conception of a typical 
contract for the sale of goods. As commercial dealings evolve, the 
parties to a sale of goods become more sophisticated and the terms 
of the bargain become more complex. The expansion and speciali­
zation of industry have given rise to sales contracts which extend far 
into the future and anticipate a variety of circumstances. The law of 
sales has evolved to correspond with commercial reality, growing 
beyond a limited application to the "one shot" contract for the sale 
of goods.143 Article 2 of the vee "applies to transactions in 
goods,"l44 and draws no distinction between our typical image of 
Labor agreements govern the ongoing relations among thousands of persons 
and affect matters not so easy to specify. Rigidity backfires. Competitive con­
ditions and technology change, Labor relations must change too .... 
Id. (second emphasis added). 

See also Cox, supra note 133, at 78 (1960) ("Not all commercial contracts, but surely 

those which are most familiar, relate to a single transaction."). 

142. Archibald Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L. REv. 601, 606 
(1956). See also Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp.~ 993 F.2d 603, 618 (7th Cir.) (Easter­
brook, J., dissenting) ("Unlike one-shot contracts for the sale of goods, labor agree­
ments endure and evolve"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 291 (1993). 
See SHULMAN & CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 125, at 3. 
[T]he heart of ~he collective agreement-indeed, of collective bargaining-is 
the process for· continuous joint consideration and adjustment of plant 
problems. And it is this feature which indicates the great difference between 
the collective labor agreement and commercial contracts generally. The latter 
are concerned primarily with "end results"; [sic] the former, with continuous 
process. 
Id. 
143. Zipporah. B. Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the 
Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1987). 
In nineteenth-century commerce, the prototypical sales transaction was the 
face-to-face sale in which the buyer paid cash and took her goods home. 
Llewellyn sought, instead, a model that reflected the reality of a twentieth­
century "nationwide indirect marketing structure." In the modem world of 
sales, Llewellyn's and ours, most commercial sellers and buyers of goods do 
not deal face-tO-face and do not immediately take the goods home. Rather, 
they contract for a sale in the future; their agreement is usually on the buyer's 
or the seller's printed form; their sale is on credit; and their relationship has 
just begun. 
Id. at 475-76. 
144. U.C.C. § 2-102 (1990). 
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one shot contracts for the sale of goods on the one hand and long 
term contracts for the sale of goods on the other. 
Like collective bargaining agreements, long-term contracts for 
the sale of goods are made in an attempt to secure a commercial 
relationship of extended duration.145 One prevalent example of a 
long-term contract for the sale of goods occurs in the natural gas 
industry.146 'JYpically, a local natural gas distributor agrees to buy 
all of its requirements from a single supplier for a period of several 
years.147 In this situation, the local distributor will forego the op­
portunity to buy gas at the lowest price available at any given time. 
However, in return, the distributor will be guaranteed an adequate 
supply of gas in the coming years. l48 
A similar situation exists in the realm of collective bargaining. 
The employer enters into an exclusive relationship with a labor 
union and foregoes the opportunity to hire non-union labor at re­
duced compensation. In return, the employer receives certainty of 
an adequate supply of qualified and productive labor. In both long­
term contracts for the sale of goods and collective bargaining agree­
ments there exists an attempt to foster an on-going contractual rela­
tionship. Notwithstanding the typical one-shot contract for the sale 
of goods, a genuine analogy may be drawn between long-term con­
tracts for the sale of goods under the VCC and collective bargain­
ing agreements. 
2. 	 Flexibility of Contracts for the Sale of Goods and 
Collective Bargaining Agreements 
A comparison of long-term contracts for the sale of goods and 
145. Koch Hydrocarbon Co. v. MOU Resources Group, Inc., 988 F.2d 1529 (8th 
Cir. 1993). The court, quoting one commentator, explained the important role of such 
agreements: "Without the supply and market security provided by long-term contracts, 
investment in the large capital assets associated with the production, transportation, 
and consumption of gas would be substantially retarded." Id. at 1533 n.5 (quoting 
Richard J. Pierce, Reconsidering the Roles ofRegulation and Competition in the Natural 
Gas Industry, 97 HARV. L. REv. 345, 354 (1983». 
146. Transcontinental Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil & Gas Bd., 474 U.S. 409, 424 
(1986) ("long-term contracts are the norm" within the natural gas industry). 
Additionally, several courts of appeals have explicitly held that the uec applies to 
contracts for the sale of natural gas. Koch, 988 F.2d at 1534; Prenalta Corp. v. Colorado 
Interstate Gas Co., 944 F.2d 677, 687 (10th Cir. 1991); American Exploration Co. v. 
Columbia Gas 1Tansmission Corp., 779 F.2d 310, 314 (6th Cir. 1985). 
147. Koch, 988 F.2d at 1533 ("[P]ipelines, including MOU, contracted with sellers 
such as Koch ... in order to ensure a reliable supply of natural gas. These agreements 
invariably were long-term contracts ...."). 
148. Id. 
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collective bargaining agreements reveals a common theme of flexi­
bility. The parties to aCBA seek to maintain a productive and co­
operative relationship with indefinite breadth,149 Likewise, Article 
2 offers a flexible framework to buyers and sellers of goods based in 
the reality of modern commercial transactions. 
Modification of a contract for the sale of goods provides an 
excellent example of the Code's implicit flexibility. In view of the 
realities of commercial transactions, section 2-209(1) of the VCC 
removed the requirement of consideration150 in modifying a con­
tract for the sale of goodS.15! The framers of Article 2 recognized 
that a degree of flexibility was essential, and that the day-to-day 
realities of transactions in goods required a departure from the 
traditional common law view of consideration.152 The comment fol­
lowing section 2-209 explains that "[t]his section seeks to protect 
149. See SHULMAN & CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 125, at 3. See also United Steel­
workers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 570 (1960) (Brennan, J., concurring) (a 
collective bargaining agreement is "the charter instrument of a system of industrial self­
government"). 
150. Of course, one of the fundamental precepts of contract law is that considera­
tion is required for the formation of an enforceable contract as well as any subsequent 
modification or agreement. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACJ'S 
185-87 (3d ed. 1987). See also United States v. Stump Home Specialties Mfg., Inc., 905 
F.2d 1117,1121 (7th Cir. 199O); Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781 
F.2d 1280, 1285 (7th Cir. 1986). 
151. U.C.C. § 2-209, cmt. 1 (1990) ("This section seeks to protect and make effec­
tive all necessary and desirable modifications of sales contracts without regard to the 
technicalities which at present hamper such adjustments."). See also, 1 THOMAS M. 
QUINN, QUINN'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE CoMMENTARY AND LAW DIGEST'll 2­
209 [A)[I] (2d ed. 1991). 
Modification of a sales contract is a common event. Indeed, multiple modifi­
cations of the same contract are not uncommon. Change is a fact of life. Less 
common but no less important is rescission of the contract. That, too, is often 
a fact of commercial life. Section 2-209 assumes the validity of both such 
events and seeks to facilitate the process. 
Id. 
152. 2 HAWKLAND, supra note 140, § 2-209:02 at 203 (1992). As Professor Hawk­
land explained, "[s]ection 2-209 has three main objectives. First, in accordance with the 
Code's policy of preserving flexibility of commercial contracts, it validates modifica­
tions of sales contracts that are made in good faith, even though those modifications are 
not supported by consideration." Id. 
See also, Robert A. Hillman, Standards for Revising Article 2 of the V.e.e.: The 
NOM Clause Model, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1509 (1994). Professor Hillman opined: 
. 	 Through the use of standards such as commercial reasonableness, unconscio­

nability, and good faith, Article 2 in large measure appears to have accom­

plished Karl Llewellyn's goal of drafting sales law that reflects societal 

customs and traditions and adjusts to evolving commercial practices, but still 

provides a framework of rules to govern commercial relationships. 

Id. at 1515 (citations omitted). 
361 1995] BETWEEN THE OBVIOUS AND THE FOOLISH 
and make effective all necessary and desirable modifications of 
sales contracts without regard to the technicalities which at present 
hamper such adjustments."lS3 
In both collective bargaining and the sale of goods, agreements 
are continuously altered without a quid pro quo exchange of con­
sideration on every point. Pursuant to section 2-209, parties to a 
sale of goods may adjust the terms of their agreement for their own 
mutual benefit, without considering whether they have satisfied the 
formalistic requirement of consideration. Analogously, considera­
tion plays a unique and reduced role in the common law of collec­
tive bargaining agreements. At least two Vnited States Courts of 
Appeals have held that consideration is not required to render a 
CBA enforceable.l54 In both contexts, the law has sought to sup­
port . economic reality instead of forcing rigid contract doctrine 
upon an incompatible situation. 
Consider the following example. A and B are parties to an 
agreement. B asks A for a modification that will bring no addi­
tional costs or inconvenience to A. A agrees to the modification, 
but B offers no additional consideration to support her side of the 
bargain. The law seeks to support the everyday realities of business 
by enforcing such modifications even in the absence of fresh consid­
eration. This example could apply to a sale of goods where the 
buyer asks the seller to deliver the specified goods three days ear­
lier than agreed, or to a situation where the union requests that an 
employee's daily coffee break be moved from 9:00 a.m. to 9:30 a.m. 
In view of the similarities that exist between contracts for the 
sale of goods and collective bargaining agreements, the Martinsville 
court was justified in relying upon the provisions of Article 2. The 
problem with the majority opinion is that it did not go far enough. 
The Martinsville court advocated the enforcement of NOM clauses 
within CBAs by arguing that the VCC holds such clauses enforcea­
ble.1ss However, the provision for the enforceability of NOM 
clauses is not a per se rule under the VCC. A better reasoned re­
sult could have been obtained if the Martinsville majority had em­
braced the subtleties of section 2-209 and applied them to the 
special challenges presented by collective bargaining. 
153. V.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. l. 
154. Certified Corp. v. Hawaii Teamsters & Allied Workers, Local 996, 597 F.2d 
1269, 1271 (9th Cir. 1979); Darnel v. East, 573 F.2d 534, 537 (8th Cir. 1978). 
155. Martinsville Nylon Employees Council v. NLRB, 969 F.2d 1263, 1268 (D.C. 
Cir.1992). 
362 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:337 
C. 	 The Limited Role of No-Oral-Modification Clauses Within the 
Uniform Commercial Code 
An exchange of consideration between two parties often oper­
ates as evidence of an agreement between those parties.156 When 
the vee dispensed with the requirement of consideration in modi­
fying a contract for the sale of goods, an effective safeguard against 
fabrication was IOSt.157 Freed from the requirement of considera­
tion, parties could accuse each other of breach of some alleged 
modification, and the court would then be faced with little more 
than a swearing match. To avoid this difficult problem, section 2­
209 of the vee provides for the enforceability of NOM clauses 
within contracts for the sale of goodS.15S The parties to a contract 
for the sale of goods, by inserting a NOM clause into their agree­
ment, may prevent the enforcement of a completely fabricated 
modification.159 
The Martinsville court, in arguing'in favor of the enforceability 
of NOM clauses, ignored the true function of section 2-209(2) 
within the vee. As comment three to section 2-209 explains, 
"[s]ubsections (2) and (3) are intended to protect against false alle­
156. Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1286 (7th 
Cir.1986). 
157. 2 HAWKLAND supra note 140, § 2-209:03 at 209 ("The elimination of the 
need for consideration to make a binding agreement to modify a contract falling within 
the scope of Article 2 also eliminated a safeguard that existed at common law against 
fraudulent or mistaken allegations that the parties had agreed to changes in the original 
contract. "); Frank A. Rothermel, Note, Role of Course of Performance and Confirma­
tory Memoranda in Determining the Scope, Operation and Effect of "No Oral Modifica­
tion" ClLluses, 48 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1239, 1247-48 (1987) ("NOM clauses were given 
effect because they replaced the evidentiary function served by the former requirement 
of consideration for contract modifications."). 
158. Wisconsin Knife Works, 781 F.2d at 1286. Judge Posner explained that "with 
consideration no longer required for modification, it was natural to give the parties 
some means of providing a substitute for the cautionary and evidentiary function that 
the requirement of consideration provides; and the means chosen was to allow them to 
exclude oral modifications [under 2-209(2)]." Id. 
159. As one commentator explained: 
From a pragmatic point of view, the validation of the no-modification-unless­
in-writing term makes good sense, because the parties ought to have some way 
in which they, themselves, can protect their contract against the uncertainty of 
an alleged modification resulting from misunderstanding or fraud. The courts 
have had no difficulty in seeing the sense of the rule, and in recognizing the 
necessity for it in view of the fact that the protection of the doctrine of consid­
eration is no longer available with respect to alleged agreements purporting to 
modify sales contracts. 
See 2 HAWKLAND, supra note 140, § 2-209:03 at 210. 
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gations of oral modifications."160 In other words, section 2-209(2) 
permits parties to erect their own Statute of Frauds. However, 
when courts are presented with alternative assurances that a modi­
fication was actually made by the parties, then there is very little to 
recommend the enforceability of a NOM clause.161 Indeed, within 
section 2-209, there is evidence that the enforceability of a NOM 
clause is not as hard and fast a rule as the Martinsville majority 
would have us believe.162 
It appears that the Martinsville majority distorted the letter 
and spirit of Article 2 of the VCC by ignoring the delicate balance 
between section 2-209(2) and section 2-209(4). The majority rea­
soned that section 2-209(2) provides for the strict .enforcement of 
NOM clauses.163 However, section 2-209(4) provides that attempts 
at modification or rescission, which do not satisfy the requirements 
of the NOM clause, may operate as a waiver.164 The Official Com­
ment states: "[s]ubsection (4) is intended, despite the provisions of 
subsections (2) and (3), to prevent contractual provisions excluding 
modification except by a signed writing from limiting in other re­
spects the legal effect of the parties' actual later conduct."165 The 
Martinsville majority did not discuss the clear tension between sec­
tions 2-209(2) and 2-209(4) of the VCC, but based its endorsement 
of the VCC approach entirely upon the strong language of section 
2-209(2).166 In selectively quoting the language of section 2-209(2), 
the majority distorted the operation of section 2-209 specifically 
and the spirit of the VCC in general.167 
Assuming for a moment that the principles of section 2-209 of 
the VCC were applied to collective bargaining agreements, the rea­
soning of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia would 
play out as follows. In the Martinsville case, the Company argued 
that the written terms of the CBA. did not provide Vnion represent­
atives with the freedom to pursue Vnion business without permis­
160. V.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. 3. 
161. Rothennel, supra note 157, at 1243. 
162. V.C.C. § 2-209(4) and cmt. 4. 
163. Martinsville Nylon Employees Council v. NLRB, 969 F.2d 1263, 1267 (D.c. 
Cir.1992). 
164. V.C.C. § 2-209(4). 
165. V.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. 4. 
166. Maninsville, 969 F.2d at 1267. 
167. See Rothennel, supra note 157, at 1240 n.3 ("[A]lthough the Code's drafters 
effected a complete reversal of the common law rule by recognizing the validity of 
NOM clauses, they softened the reversal by adding the waiver provision of § 2-209(4).") 
(citing E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACI'S § 7.6 at 476 (1982». 
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sion from management. Under the principles of section 2-209(2) 
and in the face of the CBA's zipper clause, the practices that had 
developed at the plant could not be viewed as an enforceable modi­
fication.l68 A strong argument could be made, however, that the 
Company, in failirtg to object to the practices of the Union repre­
sentatives, acquiesced to those practices. Thus, under UCC theory, 
it could be argued that such Company acquiescence operated as a 
waiver under section 2-209(4). 
There are similarities that exist between the Martinsville case 
and the facts surrounding a typical transaction in goods. The par­
ties in Martinsville did not argue that there was a modification of 
their written agreement supported by fresh consideration. Practices 
had developed at the plant where Union representatives received 
greater latitude in pursuing Union business on Company time. 
There is no evidence, however, that the Union or the employees 
offered any consideration in return for the representatives' new­
found freedoms. If the Union had been able to show some evi­
dence of consideration, then the court would have received some 
assurance that the CBA had actually been modified. 
Additionally, the alleged modification of the CBA was not evi­
denced by a' writing. Indeed, this was the main issue in the case. 
Within the UCC, the NOM clause plays an evidentiary role that 
replaces the assurances typically provided by an exchange of con­
sideration. If some other evidence of a bona fide modification is 
provided, however, the function of the NOM clause is discharged. 
When a NOM clause ceases to serve a function, there is no rational 
reason for courts to enforce it,169 The difficulty with the Martins­
ville opinion is that it appears to require that there be a writing for 
the sake of having a writing. This reasoning, however, is not de­
rived from the principles of the UCC. 
168. V.C.C. § 2-209(2). 
169. Karl N. Llewellyn, speaking as an advocate of legal realism, stated the 
following: 
And those involved are folk of modest ideals. They want law to deal, they 
themselves want to deal, with things, with people, with tangibles, with definite 
tangibles, and observable relations between definite tangibles - not with 
words alone; when law deals with words, they want the words to represent 
tangibles which can be got at beneath the words, and observable relations be­
tween those tangibles. They want to check ideas, and rules, and formulas by 
facts, to keep them close to facts. They view rules, they view law, as means to 
ends; as only means to ends; as having meaning only insofar as they are means 
to ends. 
Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism - Responding to Dean Pound, 44 
HARV. L. REv. 1222, 1223 (1931). 
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The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia remanded 
the case to the NLRB to determine if the contested practice was 
actually an implementation of the written terms of the CBA.170 The 
court then offered one possible interpretation of the facts that 
would permit the CBA and the parties' course of performance to be 
viewed as consistent.l7l The strength of this position, however, is 
questionable, especially because both . the Administrative Law 
Judge and the NLRB found the behavior of Union officials to be 
clearly inconsistent with the written terms of the CBA.172 
In holding the zipper clause of the CBA enforceable, the court 
left no function for the parties' course of performance beyond that 
of defining the written terms.173 A better-reasoned conclusion 
would have allowed the parties' course of performance to playa 
more substantial role. In the dynamic realm of collective bargain­
ing, interpretation of relationships and agreements cannot be 
driven by the formality of a NOM clause. Indeed, it is possible that 
a practice developed at the facility, which was contrary to the writ­
ten terms of the CBA but nevertheless was met with acquiescence. 
The day-to-day reality of the parties' activities should not be ig­
nored simply because their CBA contains a zipper clause.174 Nor 
should the courts manipulate facts in an attempt to find harmony 
with the explicit terms of a contract. 
Following the principles of Article 2,175 the Maninsville major­
170. 	 Martinsville, 969 F.2d at 1270. 
171. 	 See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. 
172. 	 Martinsville, 969 F.2d at 1269. 
173. 	 [d. 
174. 	 [d. at 1271. 
[U]nion and management may informally agree over an extended period of 
time to allow seemingly innocuous practices that are not covered in the con­
tract to become part of the settled expectations of the parties, without going 
through the formality of amending the contract. It may then be downright 
disruptive to the parties' bargaining relations to prevent these firmly estab­
lished expectations from being enforced as part of the agreement. 
[d. (Wald, J., dissenting). 
175. Karl N. Llewellyn rejected the mechanical application of black-letter rules. 
As the driving force behind Article 2, Professor Llewellyn sought rules which embraced 
the facts and realities of individual situations. Professor Wiseman described Llewellyn's 
view as follows: 
Faced with rules that no longer fit the facts of sales transactions, the courts in 
some cases "construed" the facts in ways that bore no relation to reality but 
instead fit the rule. In so doing, courts preserved the rule without addressing 
what Llewellyn called the "felt needs" of the case. Alternatively, courts en­
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ity should have examined the parties' course of performance to de­
termine if certain provisions of the CBA had been waived. Such an 
analysis would have allowed the parties' course of performance to 
playa more genuine and realistic role in interpreting what had actu­
ally transpired between the Union and the Company. If the parties' 
actions could be viewed as an attempt at modification or rescission 
of the written CBA, then the court should have held that the NOM 
clause had been waived. 
It is here that the tension between sections 2-209(2) and 2­
209(4) comes into full play. The former holds that NOM clauses 
are to be enforced, while the latter provides that conduct which 
does not meet the requirements of section 2-209(2) may, nonethe­
less, operate as a waiver. As one commentator has noted, "[s]ome 
courts and commentators have hurriedly concluded that this waiver 
provision emasculates the no oni! modification provision because a 
party could always claim a waiver of the NOM clause."176 Of 
course, common sense dictates that such a conclusion is without 
merit. One cannot reasonably argue that the effect of one provision 
of the DCC is abrogated by another provision two sentences 
laterP7 
A more thorough analysis of Article 2 reveals that these two 
sections can operate consistently and effectively. It may be force­
fully argued that section 2-209(2), when read in conjunction with 
section 2-209(4), only bars "mere oral assertions of an oral modifi­
cation."178 In the face of a contract containing a NOM clause, no 
gaged in "mechanical, deductive reasoning from formulae which crush[ed] to 
death some needed, budding, economic institution." The law was, then, 
mechanical at best and destructive at worst; it was divorced from reality and 
incapable of producing the certainty and predictability especially desirable in 
commercial transactions. 
Thus, for Llewellyn, the realist, sales law was obsolete in two senses. The 
content of the rules of an earlier time did not fit the reality of contemporary 
sales transactions, and the form of the rules was derived from a few abstract 
doctrines with no specific connections to actual transactions. These "life-re­
mote" abstractions were thought to be universally applicable. But Llewellyn 
had a notion that law should take a different form. 
Zipporah B. Wiseman, The Limits of VISion: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 
100 HARV. L. REv. 465, 476 (1987) (citations omitted). 
176. Rothermel, supra note 157, at 124l. 
177. Id. at 1248. See also, Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781 
F.2d 1280, 1286 (7th Cir. 1986). 
178. Rothermel, supra note 157, at 1243. See also, Wisconsin Knife Works, 781 
F.2d at 1286 ("Whether called modification or waiver, what National Metal Crafters is 
seeking to do is to nUllify a key term other than by a signed writing. If it can get away 
with this merely by testimony about an oral modification, section 2-209(2) becomes 
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party may allege that the contract has been modified without offer­
ing some supporting evidence. Ifa party is able to offer some evi­
dence that provides a safeguard against fraud or fabrication, then 
the court should consider whether some portion of the written 
agreement has been waived. In this way, courts may guard against 
frivolous litigation based solely upon fabricated claims. At the 
same time, the flexibility required by the realities of industrial-labor 
relations will be retained. 
Section 2-208 of the vee, which governs the role of parties' 
course of performance in contracts for the sale of goods, lends sup­
port to this interpretation. The comment under section 2-208 pro­
vides that: 
Where it is difficult to determine whether a particular act merely 
sheds light on the meaning of the agreement or represents a 
waiver of a term of the agreement, the preference is in favor of 
"waiver" whenever such construction ... is needed to preserve 
the flexible character of commercial contracts and to prevent sur­
prise or other hardship.179 
The vee seeks to support the realities of commercial transactions 
as evidenced by the behavior of the parties. If an act by one party is 
met with acquiescence by another party on ten separate occasions, 
this course of performance should not be ignored simply because 
the parties' contract contains a NOM clause. On the other hand, 
inadvertence should not be mistaken for acquiescence. 
Instead of relying upon the boilerplate language of the eBA's 
zipper clause, the Martinsville court should have completed its 
vee analysis by employing the provisions of section 2-209(5). Sec­
tion 2-209(5) provides that: 
A party who has made a waiver affecting an executory por­
tion of the contract may retract the waiver by reasonable notifi­
cation received by the other party that strict performance will be 
required of any term waived, unless the retraction would be un­
just in view of a material change of position in reliance on the 
waiver.18o 
In Martinsville, the eBA explicitly required that Vnion representa­
tives obtain permission before leaving their production posts to 
very nearly dead letter."). See also 2 IiAWKLAND, supra note 140, § 2-209:5 at 218 (Pro­
fessor Hawkland also offers "an argument against allowing [section 2-209(2)] to be 
waived by allegations of oral agreements"). 
179. V.C.C. § 2-208 emt. 3 (1990). 
180. V.C.C. § 2-209(5) (1990). 
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pursue Union business. For a period of several years, however, the 
Company did not enforce this requirement. Under the principles of 
section 2-209, such acquiescence on the part of the Company should 
be viewed as a waiver of the permission requirement. However, 
section 2-209(5) allows a party to retract its waiver in the absence of 
detrimental reliance. The language of section 2-209(5) appears par­
ticularly applicable in this situation, in that the NLRB found that 
the Company merely attempted "to return to the written terms of 
the agreement."181 
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia should not have remanded the case to the NLRB to de­
termine if the parties' course of performance was simply an imple­
mentation of the terms of the written agreement. Instead, the 
parties' actions should have been examined to determine if the per­
mission requirement of the CBA had been waived. Further, if a 
waiver was found, the court should have reviewed the actions of the 
Union to determine if it had detrimentally relied on the waiver. 
Did the Union representatives fail to make demands for increased 
freedoms, believing that they had already obtained them? Did the 
Union pursue compensation increases less vigorously in the belief 
that it had won a victory in another area? Did the Union fail to 
designate an adequate number of Union representatives in the be­
lief that the existing number were free to pursue Union business up 
to forty hours per week? In the absence of such reliance, the Com­
pany should be permitted to retract its waiver and return to the 
written terms of the agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
Flexibility is the hallmark of collective bargaining agreements. 
In view of this, the Martinsville majority's formalistic dependence 
upon a zipper clause is unsatisfying. Further, a selective reliance 
upon section 2-209(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code, holding 
NOM clauses to be enforceable, is not the proper solution to the 
issue presented. 
The Martinsville court should have developed its Code analysis 
more fully. Section 2-209(2) is not simply a black-letter rule which 
holds NOM clauses enforceable. Instead, it is one fragment of a 
statutory construct. To remove section 2-209(2) from the context of 
its surrounding provisions distorts both the part and the whole. 
181. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 294 N.L.R.B: 563, 565 (1989). 
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Properly understood, Article 2 provides a set of flexible rules which 
embrace the realities of commercial transactions. When the Code is 
viewed in this manner, the application of vec principles to a col­
lective bargaining dispute seems more obvious than foolish. 
Matthew 1. McDermott 
